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The BUSKLAW September Newsletter: The Retro Case of Marley, the Unbearing Labradoodle

 

DISCLAIMER: probably not the real Marley. Still cute. 

Having just survived the dog days of a Michigan summer, it's only fitting that we discuss a case involving a dog: Marley, a Labradoodle. How this cute canine could be the subject of a lawsuit before Kent County Judge Christopher Yates is questionable, but hey, lawyers argue, and they actually get overpaid for it! (Most dogs don't argue, except for Huskies; my working hypothesis is that Huskies are just reincarnated trial lawyers.)

The plaintiff in the case is Bainbridge Labradoodles, a Labradoodle purveyor at $3K per puppy. Defendant is Susan Viele, a Labradoodle aficionado. In June 2016, Bainbridge and Viele signed a "breeder agreement," under which Bainbridge loaned Marley to Viele until Marley yielded four litters of puppies that would go to Bainbridge for breeding or placement. Marley gave birth to seven healthy puppies in September 2016, but despite repeated attempts, that was all. And now the thick plottens.  

Bainbridge told Viele that Marley should receive an implant to induce heat. Viele refused, believing that an implant would harm Marley. Viele suggested a more natural method of inducing heat; Bainbridge refused; the parties reached an impasse. Bainbridge sued Viele for breach of contract - and to recover Marley.

In cross-motions for summary disposition, Bainbridge argued some vintage legal theories that undoubtedly caused Judge Yates to dust off several old volumes of the Michigan Reports:
  • Conversion. To win on this theory, Bainbridge must prove that Viele "wrongfully exerted dominion" inconsistent with Bainbridge's right to possess Marley.  Problem: Viele, although she doesn't own Marley, has the right to possess Marley until she gives birth to four litters of little Labradoodles.
  • Trespass to Personalty. How unique! This cause of action dates back to 1892.  Michigan courts have hardly touched it since. Think of it as like conversion. But this argument has the same problem as pleading conversion.
  • Replevin. Say what? Back to the 1800s again? The Michigan legislature long ago replaced a replevin action with statutory "claim and delivery." Basically, someone unlawfully has my stuff, and I want it back. ("Stuff" includes Marley, who under Michigan law is a "chattel.") Replevin has no place in 21st-century pleadings in Michigan.
  • Breach of Contract. For this to fly, Bainbridge must prove first, there was a contract; second, Viele breached the contract; and third, Bainbridge incurred damages as a result (note that each healthy puppy is worth $3K). This cause of action makes the most sense in this case.
Judge Yates is an expert at seeing through the fog of lawyers' farfetched claims. Unlike some judges who slot trial lawyers who plead stale or baseless claims in the "never-to-be-trusted-again-because-you-wasted-my-precious-time" category, Judge Yates is a forgiving jurist. He's prone to address litigants' claims in a firm but friendly manner. So in his decision issued July 7, 2020, he threw out all claims except for the obvious one: breach of contract. And when Viele filed a 45-page motion for reconsideration, he calmly reaffirmed his finding that it all boils down to whether Marley can have puppies. 

Judge Yates then suggested a simple way to resolve the case. He'll appoint an expert (or review the finding of a veterinarian hired by Viele) to examine Marley to see if she can have puppies. With that evidence, the case will proceed to trial on the breach of contract claim. But what happens if Viele won't produce Marley for an exam? Under the Michigan model jury instructions (that also apply to a bench trial without a jury), "the Court may have to draw an adverse inference from the refusal that prevents the development of evidence on the central issue of the case," i.e., disadvantage Viele in that situation. 

And that will be that. Whether or not Marley can pop out puppies, we wish her happy times in a loving home for many dog years hence. 
____________________________________
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